TORTS-PARENT- CHILD-

NEGLIGENT

SUPERVISION

PROTECTED BY PARENT-CHILD IMMUNITY-Foldi

AND INSTRUCTION

v. Jeffries, 182 N.J.

Super. 90, 440 A.2d 58 (App. Div. 1981).
The parent-child immunity doctrine,' a controversial principle
which denies an unemancipated child the right to institute suit against
his parents,2 is laden with moral overtones that complicate the resolution of tort actions between parent and child. Under this doctrine,
parents historically enjoyed complete immunity for all tortious wrongs4
3
personally inflicted upon their offspring. Shocking factual scenarios
and progressive jurisprudential notions, 5 however, ultimately warranted a restriction of the doctrine to actions in negligence. 6 Yet, the
application of parental immunity by the courts to negligence cases has
not been uniform among jurisdictions. 7 The courts apply the immuFor a discussion of the early American cases that constitute the root of the parent-child
immunity doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 22-38.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 865 (4th ed. 1971). Courts have
predicated parental immunity on seven considerations: family tranquility, danger of fraud,
possibility of succession, depletion of the family exchequer, analogy to interspousal immunity,
domestic governance, and parental discipline and control. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1072-76 (1930). For a discussion of these considerations, see Comment, The Parent-ChildTort Immunity in Massachusetts, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV.
309, 313-15 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Tort Immunity in Massachusetts]; Comment,
ParentalImmunity: Mississippi'sGift to the American Family, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 597, 60306 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, ParentalImmunity.].
E.g., Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 835 (1891) (parental immunity from
intentional tort action based on false imprisonment); Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181
A. 153 (1935) (parental immunity from negligence action for automobile accident injury),
overruled, France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 506-07, 267 A.2d 490, 494 (1970).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 28, 32 & 35.
5 For example, courts have considered the most common justifications for parental immunity-preservation of family harmony and prevention of collusive claims-and determined that
these justifications are no longer sufficient to bar meritorious claims. See, e.g., Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231 (1974) (recognizing that reliance on family harmony justification was without
authority and rejecting immunity); France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500 (1970) (rejecting family harmony justification; indicating that courts can ferret out fraudulent claims);
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974) (finding danger of
fraud insufficient basis for parental immunity). Instead of invoking the immunity doctrine based
upon these justifications or relying on the force of the criminal law to vindicate wrongs between
family members, cf. Tevis v. Tevis, 155 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 1978) (finding intentional
tort claim against spouse actionable), the courts have shifted their focus to the fundamental
principle of civil law, "provid[ing] redress for wrongful injury." Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J.
535, 547 (1978); see also Peterson v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970)
(finding children entitled to same redress for wrongs as adults).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 68-75. See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1066 (1981).
Compare Peterson v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970) (permitting
child to pursue negligence claims against parents) and Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 437, 224
A.2d 588, 591 (1966) (holding that there are "no sufficient grounds for denying unemancipated
minors as a class a right enjoyed by other individuals") and Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528
P.2d 1013 (1974) with cases cited infra note 8.
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nity doctrine in varying degrees. Some jurisdictions find parents absolutely immune." Most courts provide parents with partial immunity
and formulate standards' to determine the immunity's appropriateness to a given negligent episode. ' 0 Recently, the New Jersey Superior
Court Appellate Division in Foldi v. Jeffries" examined the scope of
the parent-child immunity doctrine with respect to the liability of
2
parents for the negligent supervision of their children.

s See, e.g., Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972) (parental immunity
applied in automobile accident case); cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont.
482, 544 P.2d 444 (1975) (spousal immunity applied in automobile accident case). These courts
agree that any societal changes since the creation of the parent-child immunity doctrine are
negligible and do not warrant a policy change.
0 For example, the California Supreme Court developed a standard holding parents to the
conduct of a "reasonable parent" in Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr.
288 (1971) (en banc). See infra text accompanying notes 43-46 for a discussion of the reasonable
parent standard. Wisconsin's "legal obligations" standard stems from an interpretation of the
exceptions to the parent-child immunity doctrine that its supreme court first enumerated in
Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). For a discussion of the Wisconsin
approach to parent-child immunity, see infra text accompanying notes 47-54. The Wisconsin
approach has been favorably discussed and adopted in varying degrees by numerous jurisdictions. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d
921, 923 (Ky. 1971); Plumley v. Klein, 338 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (1972); Grodin
v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 401-02, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Ct. App. 1980); Foldi v. Jeffries,
182 N.J. Super. 90, 440 A.2d 58 (App. Div. 1981); Gross v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 158 N.J.
Super. 442, 386 A.2d 442 (App. Div. 1972); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex.
1971); see also W. PRossER, supra note 2, § 122, at 867-68.
I0 A minority of jurisdictions has completely abrogated the immunity doctrine without
limitation in negligence suits by unemancipated minor children against their parents. See, e.g.,
Peterson v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1970) (reasoning that
restoration of family harmony is unlikely to be aided by prohibiting reparations because impairment of family relationship occurs when wrong is committed); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432,
224 A.2d 588 (1966); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974).
11 182 N.J. Super. 90, 440 A.2d 58 (App. Div. 1981).
'2 Other jurisdictions have been directly confronted with the question whether parents
should be immune from suit for failure to adequately supervise their children. In Holodook v.
Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 50-51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871-72 (1974), the Court
of Appeals of New York determined that the parent owes his child no legal duty of supervision
beyond minimal criminal standards, thus negligent supervision is not actionable. For an in-depth
discussion of New York's position, see Hollister, Parent-ChildImmunity: A Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 516-24 (1982). The Supreme Court of Idaho recently
adopted the Holodook reasoning, finding the parent-child immunity doctrine bars actions by
children for negligent supervision. Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d 560 (1980). It
seems that Illinois would not permit actions for negligent supervision. Illinois courts immunize
parental conduct for "mere negligence within the scope of the parental relationship." Illinois
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 83 II1. App. 3d 234, 236, 403 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (App. Ct.
1980); see also Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 77 I11. 2d 165, 395 N.E.2d 538 (1979).
Negligent parental supervision is actionable in Hawaii and Wisconsin. See Peterson v. City of
Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d
825 (1972); Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970). Although the
Supreme Court of Minnesota abrogated the parent-child immunity doctrine and adopted the
"reasonable parent standard," it specifically found parents immune from suit for "negligent child
rearing." Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 n.9 (Minn. 1980).
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In Foldi, a two-and-one-half year old child momentarily wandered away from her mother, who was gardening and unaware of the
child's absence.1 3 While away from her mother, the child entered a
neighbor's yard and was bitten by the neighbor's dog. 14 The mother
later found the child bleeding and crying on a neighbor's driveway."
The infant, through a guardian ad litem,'6 sued the dog's owners, the
Jeffries, who denied liability and filed a third-party complaint against
the parents for indemnification.'" Shortly thereafter, an amendment
to the infant's complaint joined her parents as defendants, alleging
their failure to reasonably supervise and adequately warn of dangers. ' 8 The Jeffries settled the initial claim before trial, 9 whereas, the
parents secured summary judgment based on the parent-child immunity doctrine. 20 On appeal, Judge Antell affirmed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment and held that the parent-child immunity
doctrine protects parents from liability for the negligent supervision of
2
their children. '
The foundation of the parent-child immunity doctrine is predicated upon "the great trilogy" 22 of American cases 2 3 Hewlett v.

11182
14

N.J. Super. at 92, 440 A.2d at 59.

Id.

15 Id.
1 Id. Suits involving parental immunity basically arise either when a child sues a tortfeasor
who impleads or counterclaims against the child's parents for contribution, or when a child
directly sues his parent in tort. In the latter case, a guardian ad litem is appointed because the
interests of the child are deemed to be adverse to that of his parents. W. PRossER, supra note 2, §
122, at 864 n.63. **A guardian ad litem is a special guardian appointed by the court to prosecute
or defend, on behalf of an infant . . . , a suit to which he is a party, and such guardian is
considered an officer of the court to represent the interests of the infant . . . in the litigation'"
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 635 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). With respect to parent-child litigation in New
Jersey, a guardian ad litem can be formally appointed by the court on either its own motion or a
verified petition. N.J. CT. R. 4:26-2(2), (4). An infant under the age of 17 must have a friend
verify and petition on his behalf. Id.
I7 182 N.J. Super. at 92, 440 A.2d at 59.
Is Id.

19 Id.
20 Id.
2 Id. at 97-98, 440 A.2d at 62.
22 Akers & Drummond, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband & WifeParent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 182 (1961). This phrase has been utilized by courts and
commentators. E.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 10 (Alaska 1967); Hollister, supra note 12, at
495; Comment ParentalImmunity, supra note 2, at 602.
21 Parent-child immunity has never been a part of English common law. See W. EvERSLEY,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 578 (3d ed. 1906); T. REEVE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 387 (1816); Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 356, 150 A. 905, 907 (1932); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 425 (1951); see also
W. PRossER, supra note 2, § 122, at 865, in which he states that "[a]lthough there were no old
decisions, the speculation on the matter has been that there is no good reason to think that the
English law would not permit actions for personal torts . . . , subject always to the parent's
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George,2 4 McKelvey v. McKelvey,2 5 and Roller v. Roller.26 In 1891,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in Hewlett, first articulated and
applied the defense of parental immunity. 27 A girl, claiming she had
been maliciously committed to an insane asylum by her mother, filed
a false imprisonment action against her mother's estate for damages
resulting from her commitment.2 8 The court dismissed the case reasoning that "[s]o long as the parent is under an obligation to care for,
guide and control, and the child is under a reciprocal obligation to aid
and comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained.- 2
Only the state, through its criminal process, may regulate parental
violence. 30 Notwithstanding a lack of supporting authority, the
Hewlett decision was followed as a well-settled rule twelve years later
in McKelvey. 3' There, the Supreme Court of Tennessee refused to
allow a child to sue her stepmother for alleged cruel and inhuman
treatment inflicted upon her with her father's consent. 32 In reaching
its decision, the court analogized to spousal immunity 33 and relied
34
upon the parent's legal right to control and discipline the child.
Scaling the heights of absurdity, the Roller court denied a fifteen year
old girl the right to institute a tort action against her father who had
been convicted of raping her. 35 The court based its decision on an
analogy to spousal immunity 3 and the idea that these civil actions
contravene public policy, for they not only disrupt family tranquility
but also debase societal mores. 37 The court ironically admitted that
incestuous rape disturbed the family unit, but stated:
[i]f it be established that a child has a right to sue a parent for tort,
there is no practical line of demarkation [sic] which can be drawn,
for the same principle which would allow the action in the case of a

privilege to enforce reasonable discipline against the child." Id. Such actions have been recognized in Canada, e.g., Deziel v. Deziel, [1953] 1 D.L.R. 651, and in Scotland, e.g., Young v.
Rankin, 1934 Sess. Cas. 499.
24 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
25 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
" 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
17 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
28 Id. at 707, 9 So. at 886.
29 Id.
30 Id.

31 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
32 Id. at 393, 77 S.W. at 665.
33 Id. at 388-89, 77 S.W. at 664-65.
34 Id. at 388, 77 S.W. at 664.
31 37 Wash. at 243, 79 P. at 788.
31 Id. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
31 Id. at 244, 79 P. at 789.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:398

heinous crime, like the one involved in the case, would allow an
38
action to be brought for any other tort.

It was largely for these reasons, the potential disruption of family
harmony and the difficulty of drawing a line between negligent and
nonnegligent acts, that other states adopted the rule as enunciated in
the "great trilogy," applying it to both intentional torts and negligence
actions.3 9 Today, a few states retain "absolute" parental immunity for
negligence 40 while a few states have totally abrogated the parent-child
immunity doctrine. 4' Most states have partially abrogated the doc42
trine.
The Supreme Court of California abrogated the immunity in
Gibson v. Gibson.43 In Gibson, the court formulated a "reasonable
parent" standard to determine whether and under what circumstances parents should be found liable for their negligence. Parental
conduct is tested by asking "what would an ordinarily reasonable and
prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?- 4 4 The Gibson
court recognized the uniqueness of the parent-child relationship and
calculated this factor into the standard. 45 Because a blind application
of negligence concepts would be unacceptable and impracticable, this
approach modifies the conventional test of reasonableness by account46
ing for the "parental role.
38 Id.
31 E.g., Gillet v. Gillet, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d 736 (Ct. App. 1959) (parental

immunity for intentional tort), overruled, Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92
Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en banc); Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 P. 7 (1931) (parental
immunity for negligence), overruled, Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 288 (1971) (en banc); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960) (parental
immunity for negligence),overruled, Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 30 A.2d 335 (1974);
Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1961) (parental immunity for negligence), overruled, Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297
N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
" See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
41 See cases cited supra note 7.
42 For a survey of the status of the parent-child immunity doctrine in the United States, see
Hollister, supra note 12, at 528-32 app.
43 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en banc).
44 Id. at 919, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 919, 479 P.2d at 652-53, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 291 (1971). The exercise of certain parental
authority over an unemancipated child would be tortious if directed against a third party, but
spanking or temporarily confining a misbehaved child will not subject a parent to liability for
battery or false imprisonment. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 625, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
The reasonable parent standard reflects the belief that jurors should decide whether or not a
person acted as a reasonable and prudent parent. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601
(Minn. 1980). The standard assumes the capability of juries in applying a modified traditional
negligence standard to adequately protect reasonable parental functions in the parent-child
relationship. Id.
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Falling in the middle of the parent-child immunity spectrum is
the Wisconsin approach. 47 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Goller v. White, 48 laid the groundwork in this area by abrogating parentchild immunity in all but two situations: "(1) Where the alleged
negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over a child;
and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care. 49 The
Goller court did not define the parameters of these exceptions in its
decision. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin construed the exceptions
narrowly almost a decade later in Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Co. 50 In Thoreson, the first exception was defined to
'5 2
mean discipline.5 1 Interpreting the particular words "other care,"
the supreme court viewed the second exception of parental discretion
as one embracing the parents' legal duties.5 3 Parental discretion was
not found to encompass the supervision or education of children because such acts differ from the legal obligations "of providing food,
54
housing, clothing, dental and medical services.."

41 See Note, supra note 9, for a discussion of the impact of Wisconsin's approach on other
jurisdictions.
48 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). Wisconsin was the first state to restrict parentchild immunity. In Goller, a 12 year old boy was injured after falling from the draw bar of a
tractor against the protruding bolts of a wheel. Id. at 404, 122 N.W.2d at 193. Because the court
left open the question of what constituted parental authority and ordinary parental discretion, it
was not clear whether the exceptions protected the operator of the tractor who stood in loco
parentis to the boy. See id. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
41 Id. (emphasis added).
50 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972). In Thoreson, a child was injured after dashing
into the path of an oncoming vehicle. The mother's failure to supervise was found to be outside
the exceptions, and thus actionable. Id. at 247, 201 N.W.2d at 753; see also Howes v. Hansen, 56
Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972) (mother's negligent supervision actionable where child was
injured by another child operating a power mower); Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d
629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970) (mother's supervision of child while playing on swing set found
outside of exceptions, thus actionable).
" 56 Wis. 2d at 246-47, 201 N.W.2d at 753. This exception does not immunize negligent
supervision. Hollister, supra note 12, at 514.
52 The court's interpretation was rendered in accordance with the rule of ejusdem generis. 56
Wis. at 246-47, 201 N.W.2d at 753. This canon of statutory construction requires that "[w]here
general words follow specific words in an enumeration describing the legal subject, the general
words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
preceding specific words." C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRtuCrION § 47.17, at 103
(1973).
11 56 Wis. 2d at 246-47, 201 N.W.2d at 753.
Id. at 247, 201 N.W.2d at 753. Although negligent supervision is not immunized, this
approach still affords parents wide latitude in raising offspring, Comment, Reasonable Parent
Standard: An Alternative to Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. COL. L. REV. 795, 807 (1976),
by immunizing the execution of legal duties germane to the "health, morals and well-being" of
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The Goller opinion eventually impacted upon New Jersey law,
but until that time absolute parent-child immunity was invoked in
negligence cases. 55 The Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the
immunity doctrine in Reingold v. Reingold. 56 In 1935, the unanimous
Reingold court reasoned that preservation of peace, tranquility, and
cohesiveness of the family unit outweighed any right an unemancipated child 57 might have to take action against his parents and possibly disrupt the family unit. 58 With this consideration in mind, Justice
Perskie, writing for the court, denied a daughter recovery for damages
incurred while riding as a passenger in an automobile owned by her
stepmother and negligently operated by her father.5 9
children. Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 639, 177 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1970).
When alleged negligence originates in areas other than legal obligations, however, the conduct
of Wisconsin parents will presumably be tested by a standard of reasonableness. Comment, The
Reasonable Parent Standard: An Alternative to Parent-Child Tort Immunity: The Case for
Abrogation of ParentalImmunity in Florida, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 794, 807-08 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, ParentalImmunity in Florida].
5- See, e.g., Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960), overruled, France v.
A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
56 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 A, 153 (1935), overruled, France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J.
500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
57 Today, eighteen is the ageof majority in New Jersey, the time at which the right to sue
and defend civil actions attaches. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17B-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
Emancipation, however, is not synonymous with majority. "Emancipation in its general sense
signifies a surrender and renunciation of the correlative rights and duties touching the care,
custody and earnings of the child." Limpert v. Limpert, 119 N.J. Super. 483, 440, 292 A.2d 38,
39 (App. Div. 1972); see also Schumm v. Schumm, 122 N.J. Super. 146, 149, 299 A.2d 423, 425
(Ch. Div. 1973). Prior to the attainment of majority there is a presumption against emancipation
of a child, and the burden of establishing that status is on the party who asserts it. Alford v.
Somerset County Welfare Bd., 158 N.J. Super. 302, 316, 385 A.2d 1275, 1278-79 (App. Div.
1978); Strauer v. Strauer, 26 N.J. Misc. 218, 222, 59 A.2d 39, 41 (Ch. Div. 1948). A child is not
immediately emancipated upon reaching the age of majority, and there is in fact no age when
emancipation automatically occurs. Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543, 443 A.2d 1031, 1037
(1982). When a person reaches 18 years of age, however, this fact constitutes prima facie
evidence of emancipation. Id. At such time a child may elect to sever his relationships with his
parents, but concurrence of the parent is not essential. Cafaro v. Cafaro, 118 N.J.L. 123, 191 A.
472 (1937). For examples of emancipation through other avenues, see Leith v. Horgan, 24 N.J.
Super. 516, 518, 95 A.2d 15, 16 (App. Div. 1953) (child's marriage); Slep v. Slep, 43 N.J. Super.
538, 543, 129 A.2d 317, 329 (Ch. Div. 1957) (induction into military service); New Jersey D Y F
S v. V, 154 N.J. Super. 531, 536-37, 381 A.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977) (court
order based on child's best interests). A compilation of the most frequently considered factors in a
determination of emancipation can be found in Katz, Schroeder & Sidman, Emancipating Our
Children-Comingof Legal Age in America, 7 FAM. L.Q. 211, 218 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Katz, Emancipating Our Children].
58 115 N.J.L. at 534-35, 181 A. at 154. The court relied principally on Hewlett and Small v.
Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 18 S.E. 12 (1923).
59 115 N.J.L. at 538, 181 A. at 156. The daughter was fully emancipated at the time of suit.
She had suffered the injuries while unemancipated. Id. at 533, 181 A. at 154. The court framed
the issue as whether an emancipated child may sue her parents for injuries which occurred
during her infancy. Id. In dictum, the court indicated that an emancipated child may sue her
parents in negligence if the cause of action arose after emancipation. Id. at 538, 181 A. at 156.
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405

Confronting facts similar to those in Reingold, the New Jersey
Supreme Court twenty-five years later in Hastings v. Hastings,6 ° sustained the parent-child immunity doctrine in a four to three decision. 6 1 The Hastings court considered the fact that the parent was
fully covered by automobile liability insurance and that any judgment
against the parent would be paid by the insurer.6 2 The court deemed
payment by a party other than the parent irrelevant in light of its
"belie[f] that true family life . ..should not include . . .the concept
of recompensable fault between parents and unemancipated children. 6' 3 The focus of the public policy underpinnings for immunity
shifted from maintaining family harmony and resources to maintaining "integrity within the family,"6 4 and avoiding collusion and
fraud. 15 Recognizing that the insured parent would both participate
in the decision to sue and desire that the child recover, the court
sought to protect insurance carriers because it deemed collusion in
making spurious claims an undeniable temptation when a family
member is injured by an insured parent. 6 In addition, the court
feared that a decision to permit actions in the context of automobile
accidents would be a valid precedent to permit actions against parents
67
for injuries suffered in the home.

60 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960), overruled, France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J.
500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
61 Justice Jacobs wrote the dissenting opinion in which he asserted that the existence of
automobile liability insurance in this case dispelled the notion that permitting the action would
"endanger the family relationship or offend any policy based on its preservation." Id. at 256, 267
A.2d at 152 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). He also argued that the possibility of collusion and fraud
provided "no just or moral basis for precluding honest and meritorious actions." Id. at 257, 267
A.2d at 153 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). The courts and juries, reasoned the dissenting justice, were
capable of ferretting out fraudulent claims. Id. Recognizing the policy consideration that some
parent-child tort actions might "undermine parental authority and discipline," id. at 258, 267
A.2d at 153 (Jacobs, J., dissenting), Justice Jacobs found that this case did not present such a
problem. Id. Justice Jacobs' rationale was eventually adopted in France v. A.P.A. Transp. Co.,
56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
62 33 N.J. at 248, 163 A.2d at 150.
"' Id. at 251, 163 A.2d at 150; see Franco v. Davis, 51 N.J. 237, 239-40, 239 A.2d 1, 2 (1968)
(immunity precluded recovery on parents' automobile insurance policy even though daughter
was adopted and had become emancipated by marriage); cf. Heyman v. Gordon, 40 N.J. 52, 53,
190 A.2d 670, 671-72 (1963) (immunity precluded wrongful death action against father for sole
benefit of unemancipated son on grounds of alleged negligent driving which resulted in death of
mother), overruled, France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
64 33 N.J. at 253, 163 A.2d at 150.
6I Id. This reasoning was later rejected in Gross v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 158 N.J. Super.
442, 444, 386 A.2d 442, 443 (App. Div. 1978) (citing Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481
(1970)). See also infra text accompanying notes 77-80.
66 33 N.J. at 252-53, 163 A.2d at 150.
67 Id. at 251, 163 A.2d at 150.
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Since the Reingold decision, the New Jersey courts have effected
a number of exceptions to parent-child immunity. 8 An exception was
carved to permit a suit by an unemancipated child against his parent's
estate. 69 The rationale for this exception is that the death of a parent
tortfeasor eliminates the threat of disturbance of family harmony and
the danger of collusion. 70 Similarly, no strong state interest in maintaining a harmonious family unit remains once a child is legally
emancipated. 7' Children can also sue for causes of action which are
legislatively conferred. For example, New Jersey courts allowed an
unemancipated child to invoke a strict liability statute in order to
recover from his parents for a dog bite injury.72 In addition, the New
Jersey courts recognize suits against parents by unemancipated minor
75
children in contract, 73 property,74 and intentional tort actions.
Although the foregoing exceptions effectively limited the
Reingold doctrine, parental immunity retained vitality in New Jersey
11The gradual erosion of New Jersey's parent-child immunity doctrine paralleled the demise
of interspousal tort immunity. See Comment, Intrafamilial Tort Immunity in New Jersey:
Dismantling the Barrierto Personal Injury Litigation, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 661, 672 (1979). It is
noteworthy that Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970), the seminal case abrogating
spousal immunity, and France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970), the
seminal case abrogating parent-child immunity, were decided on the same day.
" Palesey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (Law Div. 1962); cf. Long v. Landy,
35 N.J. 44, 171 A.2d 1 (1961) (wife permitted to sue husband's estate).
70 Weinburg v. Underwood, 101 N.J. Super. 448, 451, 244 A.2d 538, 540 (Law Div. 1968);
Palesey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 299, 176 A.2d 818, 820-21 (Law Div. 1962).
" Weinburg v. Underwood, 101 N.J. Super. 448, 451, 244 A.2d 538, 540 (Law Div. 1968).
Public policy is not served, in particular, when the complaining child is self-supporting and 30
years of age. Id. Certain authorities contend, however, that maintenance of the family structure
in regard to emancipated children is a social value worth preserving. See generally Katz,
Emancipating our Children, supra note 57.
72 Dower v. Goldstein, 143 N.J. Super. 418, 363 A.2d 373 (Law Div. 1976). In Dower,
parents were found not immune from a suit brought under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:19-16 (West
1973), imposing strict liability on dog owners, by their three year old child who had been bitten
and seriously injured by their German Shepard. The possibility of collusion and fraud against
insurance companies in dog bite cases was considered minimal. 143 N.J. Super. at 422, 363 A.2d
at 375.
11 See Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 259 (1960) (Jacobs, J. dissenting), overruled, France
v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); In re Flash, 51 N.J. Super. 1, 29, 143
A.2d 208, 223 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 28 N.J. 38, 144 A.2d 907 (1958) (parent liable to
minor children in action to recover profit or interest from trust fund expenditure contrary to
law).
" The most acrimonious litigation over property arises among family members. McCurdy,
supra note 2, at 1075. One commentator has taken the position that a child's person is certainly
no less valuable and worthy of the law's protection than his property. Comment, Tort Liability
of a Parentto Minor UnemancipatedChildfor Willful and Wanton Acts, 41 MARQ. L. REV. 188,
195 (1952). The court in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963),
adopted this reasoning.
71 E.g., Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 30 A.2d 335 (1974) (child not precluded from
recovery in wrongful death action against father who allegedly murdered or recklessly killed
mother).
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until 1970, when the supreme court overruled Reingold, Hastings,
and their progeny in France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp.76 As in
Reingold and Hastings, the France court examined whether parental
immunity should apply in the context of an automobile accident
case. 77 Justice Proctor first acknowledged that Hastings had shifted
the justification for parental immunity from the preservation of family harmony to avoidance of collusion and fraud, 78 then reasoned that
all meritorious claims should not be barred simply to avoid the bringing of collusive suits. 79 The judicial system, observed the court, is
capable of ferreting out fraudulent claims. 8 0
While supporting the immunity's partial abrogation, the France
court limited its holding to automobile injury cases. 8 ' It nonetheless
noted by referring to the Goller exceptions "that there may be areas
involving the exercise of parental authority and care over a child
which should not be justiciable in a court of law. '8 2 Four years later,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Small v. Rockfeld 3 cited these
exceptions with apparent approval in holding that parental immunity
terminates when parental authority and the adequacy of child care
84
are not at issue.
The Goller exceptions were ultimately embraced as the law of
New Jersey by the appellate division in Gross v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.8 5 In this case, a child recovered in a direct action against his
father who injured him while operating a power lawn mower.8 6 The
court stated that the alleged negligence arose from the affirmative act
of the parent mowing the lawn,8 7 not from the exercise of parental
authority. 8 The court discerned no difference between a parent's
negligence in driving a car or pushing a lawn mower. 89 Thus, the
56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
Id. at 503-04, 267 A.2d at 492.
78 Id. at 505, 267 A.2d at 493.
79 Id.
76
77

80 Id.

11Id.

at 507, 267 A.2d at 494.
Id.
66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335 (1974).
84 Id. at 243, 330 A.2d at 342. In Small, the court permitted a grandmother, on behalf of her
grandson, to bring a wrongful death action against her deceased daughter's spouse, alleging that
he had either murdered the daughter or caused her death by his reckless conduct. Id. at 246, 330
A.2d at 344. For a survey of cases permitting wrongful death actions against a parent on behalf
of a child for the death of the other parent, see Annot., 87 A.L.R.3d 849 (1978).
85 158 N.J. Super. 442, 447, 386 A.2d 442, 445 (App. Div. 1978).
88 Id. at 444, 386 A.2d at 443.
87 Id. at 447, 386 A.2d at 445.
88 Id. at 448, 386 A.2d at 445.
89 Id. at 446, 386 A.2d at 444.
82
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father's act was not immunized.9 0 Noting that the New Jersey court
had not previously applied the Goller exceptions, 9 ' the appellate divi92
sion suggested that the exceptions be strictly construed in the future.
In Foldi v. JefJries,93 the appellate division rendered its construction
of the Goller exception which immunizes legal obligations and "other
care.
The Foldi court briefly reviewed prior New Jersey law dealing
with parent-child immunity, 94 specifically rejecting the rationale of
Convery v. Maczka, 95 a New Jersey Law Division case involving
substantially similar circumstances to Foldi.9 6 Convery treated the
parent as a "person with a special relationship imposing a duty
towards a child"9 7 and held that the parent could be found liable for
negligent supervision.9 The Foldi court refused to separate the immunity associated with parental care and authority from the duty to
supervise which, in this type of situation, originates from the parentchild relationship.9 9 Notwithstanding Convery, the Foldi court concluded that the decisive factor of the prior cases was not whether the
exercise of parental care would have precluded a child's injury, 100 "but
10Id. at 447, 386 A.2d at 445. The court viewed its decision as a mere extension of the France
spirit. The court further suggested that a threshold issue of whether the immunity applies should
be decided by the judge, not the jury, and the parent should bear the burden of coming forward
with evidence to show that his conduct is within one of the Goller exceptions to sustain an
immunity defense. Id. at 448, 386 A.2d at 445.
91 Id. at 447, 386 A.2d at 445. In Fritz v. Anderson, 148 N.J. Super. 68, 371 A.2d 833 (Law
Div. 1977), the alleged parental failure to supervise and control an infant to prevent him from
wandering into a construction site, was held to fall "within the realm of parental authority and
discretion," and thus was not actionable. Id. at 73, 371 A.2d at 835. Arguably, this court was the
first to apply the Goller exceptions.
92
158 N.J. Super. at 447, 386 A.2d at 445.
13
182 N.J. Super. 90, 440 A.2d 58 (App. Div. 1981).
11 Id. at 92-94, 440 A.2d at 59-61.
" 163 N.J. Super. 411, 394 A.2d 1250 (Law Div. 1978).
96 182 N.J. Super. at 93, 440 A.2d at 60. In Convery, the plaintiff fractured his arm when he
jumped off a chair. 163 N.J. Super. at 413, 394 A.2d at 1252.
97 163 N.J. Super. at 417, 394 A.2d at 1253.
98 Id.

99 182 N.J. Super. at 94, 440 A.2d at 60.
100It has been observed that in most cases involving the adequacy of parental supervision the
child's injury might have been prevented had the parent supervised more closely. For example,
the New York Court of Appeals stated in Holodook v. Spencer:
We can conceive of few, if any, accidental injuries to children which could not have
been prevented, or substantially mitigated, by keener parental guidance, broader
foresight, closer protection and better example. Indeed, a child could probably avoid
most physical harm were he under his parents' constant surveillance and instruction,
though detriment more subtle and perhaps more harmful than physical injury might
result. If. .. negligent supervision claims were allowed, it would be the rare parent
who could not conceivably be called to account in the courts for his conduct toward
his child, either by the child directly or by virtue of [other] procedures . ...
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 45-46, 324 N.E.2d 338, 343, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 867 (1974).
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whether the parents' conduct was the causative agency of harm or
created the foreseeable risk thereof and was negligent without reference to any duty of parental care."' 0 '
Judge Antell noted that Foldi did not involve an affirmative
act. 0 2 He further stated, however, that every individual must answer
for affirmative and nonaffirmative acts which proximately cause "reasonably foreseeable harm to others."'' 0 3 Therefore, the application of
0 4
immunity may only occur after a "weighing of competing policies."'
Realizing that the original justifications for immunity had been rejected and there were no authoritative statements delineating a consistent policy for a limited parent-child immunity, the Foldi court
comprehensively examined several social considerations which
05
weighed in favor of immunizing negligent supervision.
The court first considered the immunity doctrine's premise-that
one who wrongfully harmed another should not suffer the consequences of his act. 0 6 The New Jersey Legislature, noted the court,
had addressed the problem in its legislative declaration accompanying
the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.107 With respect to sovereign immunity the legislature recognized the inherent unfairness of strictly applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity.0 8 Yet, since " 'the area in
which the government has the power to act for the public good is
almost without limit,' "109 the legislature found that the " 'government should not have the duty to do everything that might be
done.' "110 Finding the legislative pronouncement on governmental
immunity relevant, the Foldi court stated that "as with the government, the area within which parents may act for the benefit of their
children and to protect their safety is almost without limit.''''' Thus,
"[p]arents like the government 'should not have the duty to do everything that might be done,' 1112 but rather parents should be permitted
3
to exercise their own discretion. "
101

182 N.J. Super. at 94, 440 A.2d at 60.

102 Id.

103 Id., 440 A.2d at 60-61.

Id. at 94-95, 440 A.2d at 61.
at 95-97, 440 A.2d at 61-62.
106Id. at 95, 440 A.2d at 61.
107 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-2 (West 1982).
04

105 Id.

182 N.J. Super. at 95, 440 A.2d at 61; see also N.J. STAT.
182 N.J. Super. at 95, 440 A.2d at 61 (quoting N.J. STAT.
1i0Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-2 (West 1982)).
'o
10

ANN.
ANN.

§ 59:1-2 (West 1982).
§ 59:1-2 (West 1982)).

Id. at 96, 440 A.2d at 61.
I1 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:1-2 (West 1982)).
Id.
3 Id.The court stated that a recognition of actions for negligent supervision, education, or
other areas in which parents must "weigh competing demands on their time, attention and
resources" would assume parents were omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient in "guard[ing]
their children from the ubiquitous threat of harm." Id.
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A second justification for parental immunity stemmed from the
difficulty that the court perceived in separating adequacy of supervision from nurturing." 4 The court observed that parental decisions
concerning the amount of care most conducive to a child's "physical,
moral, emotional and intellectual growth" incorporate "expectations
and insights into the child's limitations and capabilities which are
sensed from intimate association and which simply cannot be articulated."' 1 5 These intangibles can neither be adequately conveyed to,
nor properly evaluated by, a trier-of-fact in testing parental care for
reasonableness." 6 As a result, the court found that public policy justified the retention of a limited immunity for parental mismanage7
ment.
In conclusion, Judge Antell reviewed the parent's purported negligent supervision as "so integrally involv[ing] the 'exercise of parental
authority and care over a child' 118 that it should be classified as a
form of nurture comparable to the provision of "food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services." ' " 9 He interpreted the Goller phrase,
"other care," to include negligent supervision and safety instructions;
therefore, the alleged activities were sheltered by the parent-child
immunity doctrine. 21 0
Whether or not a child's tort action against his parents is cognizable in court unfortunately depends more on the accident of jurisdictional residence than parental negligence. As an overall approach,
New Jersey's standard embodied in the Foldi decision is superior to the
other parent-child immunity standards. The inexcusable flaw of the
"absolute" immunity approach is its refusal not only to place value on
a child's bodily welfare, as opposed to his contractual or property

114

Id.

"I

Id. at 97, 440 A.2d at 62.

11

Id.

117

11

Id.
Id. at 98, 440 A.2d at 62 (quoting France, 56 N.J. at 507, 267 A.2d at 490).

11

Id.

Id. It should be noted that the same conclusion was reached in Carey v. Davison, 181 N.J.
Super. 283, 437 A.2d 338 (Law Div. 1981). Carey, decided a month before Foldi, involved an
infant plaintiff who was struck by an automobile as she crossed the street. The defendant-driver
counterclaimed against plaintiff's parents for contribution on a theory of negligent supervision.
For purposes of his motion to dismiss the counterclaim the father admitted that he observed
traffic flow and let his child cross the street. The court found that his actions fell within "the
greater responsibility of supervising the child and were thus protected by the parent-child
immunity doctrine." Id. at 290, 437 A.2d at 342. Moreover, the motion was granted because the
court simply refused to recognize negligent supervision as a tort in New Jersey. Id. at 289-90, 437
A.2d at 342. The Carey court indicated, however, that it would not dismiss the counterclaim if
amended to make allegations comparable to those asserted in Convery, instead of relying upon a
mere allegation of negligent supervision. Id. at 292, 437 A.2d at 343-44.
120
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rights,' 2 but also its failure to acknowledge the pecuniary need of
children who have neither insurance coverage nor parents willing to
pay for extensive medical costs.
The "reasonable parent" standard, like the absolute immunity
standard, is also subject to criticism.1 22 First, any deviation in childrearing practices from prevailing community standards because of
differing ethnic, cultural, or religious practices preponderates in favor
of judgments against parents.123 The legitimacy of the judicial system
is jeopardized when jury verdicts are returned patently tainted by
individual juror's views of correct or model parenting.' 24 This ingrained bias is not counter-balanced by precise instructions from the
judge to the jury. 25 Second, when the tortfeasors are parents who
hold an insurance policy, they will be required to submit their familial
conduct to public scrutiny as a condition precedent to insurance recovery.'2' Third, uninsured or inadequately insured parents may
refuse to litigate their child's claim for fear of vulnerability to a claim
for contribution from tortfeasors who are permitted by procedural
27
rules to implead parents on an allegation of negligent supervision.
In short, this standard obstructs access to the courts by threatening to
question child-rearing methods, invade family privacy, and impose
"I See W. PnossER, supra note 2, § 122, at 865, in which he notes that contractual and
property actions against parents have always been part of the common law. See also supra notes
73 & 74 and accompanying text. The separate treatment of property and tort actions merely
perpetuates an arbitrary and meaningless distinction. Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 452, 224 A.2d
588 (1966). Judicial protection of a minor's property rights should not be more zealous than the
right of his person. See Goller, 20 Wis. 2d at 412, 122 N.W.2d at 197.
122 See Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (1980); Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595, 601-04 (Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske, J., dissenting); Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d
35, 46, 325 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 868 (1974).
123 Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 602-03 (Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske, J., dissenting).
Application of a "standardized norm" to the parent-child relation would curtail parental discretion in allowing children to undertake responsibility and gain independence. Holodook v.
Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 46, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 868 (1974).
The possibility of impingement upon recognized constitutional rights should not be overlooked. The fundamental right of child rearing has been recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972). Moreover, freedom of choice in matters of family life is a liberty
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
124 Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 602 (Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske, J., dissenting).
125 Id. Years of conditioning and attitude development from a family relationship are never
sufficiently undone by a few words. Assuming jury prejudices were controlled, however, the
danger of collusion, which is greatly increased because parents are often the only witnesses
capable of describing the circumstances under which their child was injured, continues to plague
jurors in evaluating parental credibility. Id,
126 Id.
127 Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 603 (Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske, J., dissenting);
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 325 N.W.2d 338, 344, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 868 (1974).
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financial liability. 28 A final problem with California's "reasonable
parent" standard is that it burdens parents with the requirement of
foreseeing all predicaments which their children could reasonably
encounter. Unfortunately, the standard fails to account for situations
which are dangerous for some children but not for others. 129 Individuality among children may be strangled because parents, in an effort to
avoid tort liability, conform their child-rearing practices to the absolutism of a uniform, objective standard.
Jursidictions employing an absolute parent-child immunity stress
the public policy of protecting parental functions, whereas jurisdictions employing a "reasonable parent" standard stress compensating
children's injuries. These approaches fail to establish an essential equilibrium between these competing values. The New Jersey approach is
superior because it respects the parental role by providing immunity
for simple domestic negligence and compensates injured children by
imposing liability for harm negligently inflicted apart from the parental role.
Although New Jersey adopted the Goller exceptions to parentchild tort immunity, the courts have not interpreted the "other care"
exception in the same manner as Wisconsin. Wisconsin, unlike New
Jersey, distinguishes between moral and legal obligations by holding
parents liable for negligent supervision. 30 Wisconsin therefore punishes parents by subjecting negligent parental acts to tort liability,
though such acts are not within the duties defined by law, but rather
represent the parent's good intentions. New Jersey's immunization of
moral as well as legal objections,' 3 ' avoids a philosophically confusing
area open to endless debate. In addition, the Wisconsin approach is
saddled with the procedural difficulties of a dual step process of
litigating such cases. This procedure requires an initial time-consum-

18 Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 602-03 (Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske, J., dissenting).
Based upon these shortcomings, the "'reasonable parent" standard has been held in general
disfavor and consequently adopted in only one other jurisdiction. See id. The "reasonable
parent" standard has found acceptance, however, in a multitude of commentary. E.g., Comment, Parental Immunity: California'sAnswer, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 179, 187 (1971); Comment,
ParentalImmunity in Florida, supra note 54, at 801; Comment, Tort Immunity in Massachusetts, supra note 2, at 331; Comment, supra note 68, at 679.
"9 Absent blatantly negligent conduct, parents cannot foretell the bounds of objectively
permissible conduct, especially today with children of younger ages engaging in activities once
reserved for adults. See, e.g., Dellno v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961) (minor
operating powerboat must be judged by same standard of care as adult).
"o See Wisconsin cases cited supra note 50.
131 See Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to Parent-Child Tort
Immunity, 47 U. COL. L. REV. 795, 807-08 (1976) for a discussion concerning the distinction
between moral and legal duties.
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ing inquiry into whether parental conduct falls within the Goller
exceptions before the issue of negligence is settled.1 32 New Jersey,
however, is not encumbered because its extension of a broader immunity disposes of the majority of cases at the initial inquiry.1 33 In view
of these above considerations, New Jersey's standard, which at first
glance appears to mirror Wisconsin's "legal obligations" approach, is
the preferable mode of tort resolution.
The Foldi decision is important because it recapitulates and further clarifies the Gross rationale: that parents should be liable to their
children for negligent affirmative acts which are committed "without
reference to any duty of parental care.' ' 34 Thus, children may recover
from their parents provided that the tortious act can be isolated from
parental conduct. More importantly, Foldi succinctly sets forth public
policy reasons that contravene the recognition of negligent supervision
as a tort. The individuality of the parent-child relationship and the
practicality of an appropriate range for parental discretion are strong
factors supporting the Foldi decision. Parents cannot be expected to
foresee and guard against all possible harm. Similarly, parents should
have wide latitude in determining what is best for their children.
The New Jersey Supreme Court now has the opportunity to
clarify the parent-child immunity doctrine in New Jersey. A consolidation of the reasoning in Gross and Foldi would serve this purpose.
All acts within the Goller enumerated exceptions should continue to
receive parental immunity. In addition, parental supervision and
safety instruction should be classified as activity falling within the
ambit of "other care," and thus, immunized. Children, therefore,
would be permitted to recovei only when the alleged parental negligence involved an affirmative act "without reference to any duty of
35
parental care.'1
Even though there is no panacea for suits in the area of parentchild immunity, New Jersey's approach equitably and rationally balances the need to protect children's bodily welfare with the need to
protect parents' ability to raise their children. It is only hoped that the
potential for a definitive statement, essential to long overdue guidance, be realized through the supreme court's utilization of Foldi as a
vehicle to a larger end.
Robert P. Williams
132

Id.

I'3

See supra note 90.

114

182 N.J. Super. at 94, 440 A.2d at 60.
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Id.

